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NOTES 
Errors in Good Faith: The Leon Exception Six Years Later 
It is perhaps unfortunate, but nonetheless inevitable, that the broad lan-
guage of many clauses within the Bill of Rights must be translated into 
adjudicatory principles that realize their full meaning only after their ap-
plication to a series of concrete cases. 1 
In the 1984 case United States v. Leon, 2 the Supreme Court revised 
the exclusionary rule, carving out a major exception. The old exclu-
sionary rule had forbidden the use at trial of evidence against a defen-
dant if it had been obtained in violation of that defendant's fourth 
amendment rights against unreasonable search or seizure. Under the 
revised rule, if the police officer requesting the warrant by which the 
disputed evidence was seized reasonably could have believed that the 
warrant was properly issued under the fourth amendment, then the 
evidence would be admitted even if the warrant in fact was defective 
· under fourth amendment standards. 3 The exception had been pro-
posed by Justice White in his Stone v. Powell4 dissent in 1976, and 
many academics had foreseen it with consternation, warning of the 
dismantling of the Warren Court's reading of constitutional protec-
tions for the accused. 5 Both the Court and commentators anticipating 
the decision dubbed this the "good faith" exception. 6 
A torrent of commentary, most of it highly critical, followed the 
release of the Leon decision. The legion of critics, often merely echo-
ing the forceful dissents of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, 
argued that the majority in Leon gutted the fourth amendment's pro-
tections based on faulty reasoning and unfair demands for evidence. 7 
1. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3108 (1989) 
(Blackrnun, J.). 
2. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
3. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. 
4. 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). 
5. See Kamisar, Gates, ''Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REv. 551 
(1984); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974); LaFave, 
The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 
43 U. PITT. L. REv. 307 (1982); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981). 
6. Leon, 468 U.S. at 924, 925; see articles cited supra note 5. 
7. For criticisms that go beyond those made in the dissenting opinions in Leon, see, e.g., Y. 
Kamisar, Prepared Remarks at the U.S. Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference (Sept. 14, 
1984) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter Prepared Remarks of Yale Kamisar]; 
LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifica-
tions, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 895, 901-11; Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Exclusionary Rule on the 
Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 85, 87-88 (1984); see also White, 
Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1273, 1281-82 (1983) 
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Professor Wayne LaFave argued persuasively that the good faith ex-
ception, when combined with the newly revised probable cause test of 
Illinois v. Gates, 8 produced "a form of incomprehensible double count-
ing. "9 As Justice Brennan explained in his dissent: "Because [the 
good faith exception and the relaxed probable cause test] overlap so 
completely, it is unlikely that a warrant could be found invalid under 
Gates and yet the police reliance upon it could be seen as objectively 
reasonable .... "Io Many commentators felt that, having substantially 
lowered the probable cause standard in Gates, the innovation in Leon 
was unnecessary and confusing. I I 
In an analysis of Leon defending its result, Professor Donald 
Dripps nevertheless criticized almost every line of Justice White's tna-
jority opinion. I2 His most telling observation was that the Court here 
recognized a constitutional violation "to which no sanction attaches, 
[and therefore] the Leon majority refused to treat the Fourth Amend-
ment as law."I3 While commentary was divided on the question prior 
to the decision in Leon, most of the post-decision writing has been 
critical. I4 
(rejecting as an impossible task any balancing of the deterrent "costs" and "benefits" of the 
exclusionary rule and therefore finding such balancing nothing more than a disingenuous ration-
ale for decisions resting on "prior dispositions or unarticulated intuitions that are never justi-
fied"). One critic of Leon nevertheless finds fault with Justice Brennan's cost/benefit analysis 
critique. Alschuler, Close Enough for Government Work: The Exclusionary Rule After Leon, 
1984 SUP. Cr. REV. 309, 346-51. 
8. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Gates lowered the threshold for the finding of probable cause needed 
to support issuance of a search warrant. Under the pre-Gates standard, the affidavit of the officer 
seeking a search warrant based on an informer's tip had to reveal the "basis of knowledge" of the 
informant (how she got the information reported to the officer) and provide support for the 
informant's "veracity" in general or "reliability" in this particular case. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 
228-29; see also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ch. 3 (2d ed. 1987); Moylan, Hearsay 
and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV. 741 (1974). Gates 
described the new standard as a "totality-of-the·circumstances," "common·sense, practical" in-
quiry whether there is probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is to be found in a given 
place. 462 U.S. at 230. Justice Rehnquist's opinion explained that the officer's "affidavit must 
provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause," 
which itself is a judgment that there is a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of crime 
will be found in a particular place." 462 U.S. at 238-39. So the new standard may be cast as 
requiring a "substantial basis" for a "fair probability" that a search of the indicated place will 
produce evidence of a crime. 
9. LaFave, supra note 7, at 924. 
10. Leon, 468 U.S. at 958 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
11. This was a main point in Justice Stevens' Leon dissent. 468 U.S. at 961; see also Prepared 
Remarks of Yale Kamisar, supra note 7, at 26; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 7, at 95-98, 
122-23. 
12. Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986). 
13. Dripps, supra note 12, at 935. Professor Dripps continued: "Leon teaches that Fourth 
Amendment violations do not matter. Such an evaluation betrays the fundamental principle of 
constitutionalism, which is after all that the Constitution states the law." Id. at 936. For a 
general response critical of Professor Dripps' reaction to Leon, see Duke, Making Leon Worse, 
95 YALE L.J. 1405 (1986). 
14. For pre-Leon support for the good faith exception, see Jensen & Hart, The Good Faith 
December 1990] Note-The Leon Exception 627 
Given this vast literature on the good faith exception, little room 
appears to exist for additional commentary on the propriety of the 
decision, its theoretical weaknesses or strengths, or what further 
changes in constitutional criminal procedure it forebodes. This Note 
will not add to the many voices complaining of the Court's miscon-
strual of the grounding of the exclusionary rule, nor of its crabbed 
notion of deterrence. Instead, it accepts, arguendo, the propriety of 
the exception and its underlying purpose, and then examines the six-
year experience with the revised rule. The proliferation of reported 
applications of the good faith exception since its adoption in 198415 
now allows an analysis of the rule that investigates how well under-
stood the change has been and whether the exception is being used to 
admit evidence that properly (even under Leon) should be sup-
pressed.16 This Note examines a set of application errors committed 
by state and lower federal courts since 1984. Part I briefly describes 
the exclusionary rule and United States v. Leon. 11 Part II then 
presents examples of types of errors made by courts applying the good 
faith exception.18 Finally, Part III discusses the factors that combined 
to increase the incidence of application error for this rule and suggests 
possible remedial tactics.19 It argues that much of the responsibility 
for the mistakes must rest with the misla~eled and complex exception 
crafted in Leon, and that the exclusionary rule's goal of deterrence 
would best be served by the pre-Leon rule which, because it retained a 
simple, inviolate exclusionary sanction in its central application, 
would more often be properly enforced. 20 
Restatement of the Exclusionary Rule, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 916 (1982); Israel, Crimi-
nal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Wa"en Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1319, 
1414 n.396 (1977); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50 TExAs L. 
REv. 736 (1972). For post-Leon criticism, see sources cited supra note 7. Dripps, supra note 12, 
is an attempt to offer a revised rationale for the Leon result, and to that extent is a positive review 
of the decision. 
15. Citations to Leon in SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS (Supp. 1986-1988) now 
number well over 500. 
16. The examples of application error set forth in Part II are the product of an unstructured 
search through lower court opinions citing Leon. No attempt has been made to compile statistics 
on the percentage of applications of the good faith exception that in fact misapply it, nor to 
compare in any thorough way the relative error rates of Leon applications with those of other 
rules in criminal procedure. It has been enough for the present purposes to investigate the appli-
cations of this rule and to observe what seems to be a high incidence of application error. The 
errors stand on their own even if, as is not likely the case, the rate of misapplication of the good 
faith exception is not higher than that for other rules in criminal procedure or elsewhere in the 
law. Their existence and the structural reasons for their continued presence are sufficient reason 
for action regardless of the relative error rates. 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 21-62. 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 63-159. 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 160-94. 
20. See infra text accompanying notes 163-68; see also infra note 23. 
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I. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION 
The Supreme Court first announced the exclusionary rule in 1886 
in Boyd v. United States, 21 and reiterated it in a procedural context in 
1914 in Weeks v. United States. 22 The rule provides that the govern-
ment may not use evidence against a defendant that it gained in viola-
tion of that defendant's fourth amendment rights.23 The early cases24 
held that the rule was a part of the fourth amendment. In later cases, 
the Court vacillated between the alternate propositions that the rule 
was merely a prudential, judicially created protection,25 and that it 
was constitutionally mandated.26 The 1961 case Mapp v. Ohio, 21 
which imposed the rule on the states, arguably grounded the rule in 
the Constitution.28 But by 1965, the Court had dispelled any remain-
ing debate over how it viewed the rule with its decision in Link/etter v. 
Walker. 29 That case, by once again resting the exclusionary rule on 
the empirical basis of its deterrent effect, cut the rule's necessary 
linkage to the Constitution. 3o 
The debate over the constitutional grounding of the exclusionary 
rule has a parallel couched in policy terms. Suppression of illegally 
obtained evidence has been defended primarily on two grounds: that 
to use such evidence would taint the judicial process with the stain of 
unconstitutionality, and that exclusion would serve to deter police ac-
tions infringing those rights.31 Linkletter, therefore, disavowed not 
21. 116 U.S. 616 (1886), overruled, Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407.08 (1976), and 
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). 
22. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
23. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383. The rule as applied in Weeks covered use of illegally obtained 
evidence by the government in its case-in-chief against the defendant whose rights had been 
violated by the search. This is the "central application" of the exclusionary rule, and it is this 
application that was disturbed in Leon. The scope of the exclusionary rule's application to other 
stages of the criminal justice process has been a topic of considerable debate in the courts. See 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule inapplicable in grand jury 
proceeding); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (applying exclusionary rule to 
sentencing proceedings); Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968); Mertens & 
Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 386-89. 
24. Boyd, Weeks, and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618 (1965); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
26. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
27. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
28. Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. Scholars are in vigorous disagreement over whether one may prop-
erly read Mapp as endorsing the constitutionally mandated view of the exclusionary rule. For a 
review of the debate (and a strong argument that Mapp did endorse that view), see Kamisar, Does 
(Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical 
Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 621-27 (1983). 
29. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
30. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636. See Kamisar, supra note 28, at 627-34. 
31. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 28, at 627-34; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 
389-406; see also Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitu-
tional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974) (arguing for a third view: a defendant has a 
personal constitutional right not to have illegally seized evidence admitted against him). 
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only the constitutional grounding of the rule, but also its "judicial in-
tegrity" policy justification. That case, along with later renderings 
:such as United States v. Calandra, 32 established that the only reason 
for exclusion was to deter police misconduct. 33 Working from this 
narrowed purpose for the exclusionary rule, justices, judges, scholars 
and lawyers began arguing that in cases where the officers involved 
believed they had complied with the procedures mandated by the 
fourth amendment, exclusion would not deter the mistakes and there-
fore the evidence should be admissible. 34 In United States v. Leon 35 
the Supreme Court adopted this reasoning, with some modifications. 
The facts in Leon were straightforward and favorable for those ar-
guing for a good faith exception. A California Superior Court Judge 
issued a warrant in September, 1981 authorizing searches of two 
. houses, a condominium, and two cars, all connected to suspected drug 
traffickers. The judge based the warrant on a facially valid affidavit 
32. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Professor Kamisar provides the following analysis of the evolution 
of the exclusionary rule's underlying rationale to its state in Calandra: 
The "deterrence" rationale and its concomitant "interest-balancing" bloomed in United 
States v. Calandra. The Weeks rule and the famous Brandeis-Holmes Olmstead dissents, 
which illuminated the rationales for the Weeks rule (although they did not succeed in ex-
tending the rule to police behavior that was merely unlawful or "unethical,'' not unconstitu-
tional), appear to have been based on what has been called the " 'one-government' 
conception" or the " 'unitary' model of a government and a prosecution." This model "sees 
all the events in a criminal prosecution as parts of a single transaction for which government 
is ultimately responsible." According to this model, "[i]t is just as important to the fourth 
amendment whether a court takes account of the fruits of a search as it is whether the 
intrusion that discovered the evidence was lawful." But in ruling that a grand jury witness 
may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained 
in violation of the fourth amendment, the Calandra Court embraced what has been called 
the " 'fragmentary' model of a prosecution." This model "separates the police intrusion 
against which the individual has a fourth amendment right from the proceedings at trial in 
which the question is merely one of remedy - not a personal remedy for the victim but a 
collective remedy for the broader social problem." According to this model, a court acts as 
"a neutral conduit of the evidence"; it is under no duty to exclude evidence merely because 
it has been unlawfully, or even unconstitutionally, obtained. 
Kamisar, supra note 28, at 638-39 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see also J.B. WHITE, 
JUSTICE As TRANSLATION 203-14 (1990). ' 
33. Beyond the judicial integrity rationale, controversy abounds about suppression's efficacy 
as a deterrent of police misconduct. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 
U.S. 388, 415-18 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970); Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical 
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973). The most 
recent contribution to the debate is a heartening study undertaken in Chicago that reached the 
following conclusions: -
Chicago's narcotics officers are virtually always in court when evidence is suppressed in 
their cases; they always eventually understand why the evidence was suppressed; and this 
experience has caused them to use warrants more often and to exercise more care when 
conducting warrantless searches. The study also demonstrates that judicial suppression, and 
the actions that police officials take in response to suppression, "punish" officers for con-
ducting illegal searches. 
Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence.· An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics 
Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1017-18 (1987). 
34. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. 
Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 842-43 (5th Cir. 1980); see also supra note 14. 
35. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
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which had been reviewed by several Deputy District Attorneys. 36 The 
problem was simply that the evidence set out in the affidavit to support 
probable cause to search was, in the judgment of the district court, "as 
consistent with innocence as ... with guilt."37 More particularly, the 
officers knew that people with drug arrest records had been seen enter-
ing and leaving these sites with paper bags; that a "confidential in-
formant of unproven reliability" had reported that the defendants 
were selling cocaine and methaqualone from one of the residences; 
that another informant of unproven reliability had reported that one 
of the defendants kept a large supply of methaqualone at the other 
residence; and that officers had observed what the Supreme Court de-
scribed as "a variety of other material ... and ... relevant activity" at 
the residences, the condominium, and the two automobiles.38 The dis-
trict judge stated that while he was certain the officer requesting the 
warrant believed the affidavit presented information sufficient to estab-
lish probable cause, the officer's judgment was incorrect. 39 Since the 
Ninth Circuit had not adopted the good faith exception requested by 
the government, the district judge granted the defendants' suppression 
motion. 40 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the refusal to adopt the good 
faith exception,41 and the United States petitioned the Supreme Court 
for review solely on that question.42 
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in an opinion 
by Justice White.43 The Court held that where it was "objectively rea-
sonable" for an officer to believe that a warrant application was proper 
with respect to fourth amendment requirements, and where the execu-
tion was in all respects proper, the fact that the magistrate44 erred in 
issuing the warrant would not lead to exclusion of the evidence against 
the defendant whose fourth amendment rights had been violated.45 
36. Leon, 468 U.S. at 901-02. 
37. Leon, 468 U.S. at 903 n.2. 
38. Leon, 468 U.S. at 901-02. 
39. Leon, 468 U.S. at 904 n.4. This probable cause determination was made prior to the 
Supreme Court's revision of the standard in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The Leon 
opinion has been criticized as unnecessary given that the affidavit may well have passed muster 
under the new "totality of the circumstances" test. See Prepared Remarks of Yale Kamisar, 
supra note 7, at 26 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
40. 468 U.S. at 903 n.3. Not all of the evidence was suppressed. The district court found 
that none of the defendants had standing to challenge the search of the condominium, which they 
had set up solely in order to run their illicit business and in which none of them had the legiti-
mate expectation of privacy recognized in their residences and cars. 468 U.S. at 903 n.3. 
41. United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983). 
42. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905. 
43. Justice Blackmun concurred separately, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall dissented, 
and Justice Stevens dissented separately. 
44. The opinion discussed "magistrates" instead of ·~udges" despite the facts of Leon be-
cause warrants are usually issued by magistrates. See Goldstein, The Search Warrant, The Mag-
istrate, and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1176 n.13 (1987). 
45. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. 
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The Court's reasoning started with the observation that "the use of 
fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure 'work[s] no new Fourth 
Amendment wrong.' "46 Given that premise, using evidence obtained 
in violation of fourth amendment rights does not mean the courts 
themselves are violating the fourth amendment. With the judicial in-
tegrity argument repudiated, the Court moved to the deterrence ra-
tionale. It observed that "[p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate's 
error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deter-
rence of Fourth Amendment violations.''47 As Justice·White asserted 
in the majority opinion, the exclusionary rule "is designed to deter 
police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and mag-
istrates. "48 Because the judicial officers have no stake in obtaining 
convictions or even arrests, the "threat of exclusion thus cannot be 
expected significantly to deter them."49 
The Court emphasized that a police officer must be reasonable in 
her belief that the warrant application was one a magistrate properly 
could authorize under the fourth amendment. If this were not the 
case, it would be unreasonable for her to rely on the warrant that the 
magistrate mistakenly issued, and exclusion would then deter her er-
ror. Four exceptions to the good faith exception were noted in Justice 
White's majority opinion. It would be unreasonable for an officer to 
rely on a magistrate-approved warrant (1) where the affidavit given the 
magistrate contained knowing or reckless falsities; (2) where the mag-
istrate abandoned his neutral and detached role; (3) where the affidavit 
was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief 
in its existence entirely unreasonable";50 and (4) where the warrant 
itself was facially deficient.51 These are all situations, reasoned the 
Court, in which any reasonably well-trained officer would recognize 
46. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)). 
This reasoning contrasts with Professor Dripps' telling observation that Leon creates the uncon-
scionable oddity of an admitted consitutional violation that has no remedy at law. See Dripps, 
supra note 12, at 935-36. 
47. Leon, 468 U.S. at 921. 
48. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. 
49. Leon, 468 U.S. at 917. Fof an assessment of the ability of magistrates to perform the role 
Leon assumes they do perform, see generally Goldstein, supra note 44. Professor Goldstein, 
following logic more than the Supreme Court's reasoning, notes that if trial courts were carefully 
to review the determinations of magistrates (especially those not law-trained) and suppress evi-
dence obtained pursuant to warrants the magistrates mistakenly had issued, the end result would 
be better-trained magistrates and better police compliance with the fourth amendment. Id. at 
1177-88. His proposals, while impeccable on logical and policy grounds, simply do not fit with 
the expressed assumptions of the Leon Court. 
50. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., 
concurring in part)). 
51. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. The listing of explicit exceptions to the exception raises the ques-
tion whether those listed were meant to be exclusive. Logically, they should not be. Any analo-
gous situation that meets the unreasonable-to-rely test should take the case out of the exception 
and back into the rule. 
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that the apparent compliance with the fourth amendment was chimer-
ical, and not to be relied upon. 
Leon's companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 52 helps illus-
trate the workings of the good faith exception. In Sheppard, the police 
had probable cause to suspect that the defendant had murdered his 
girlfriend, and presented their information to a judge. The officers 
made their presentation on a Sunday, when the local court was closed, 
and thus they had difficulty finding a warrant application form. They 
finally found one printed for a different district and designed for "con-
trolled substance" searches. The officer in charge altered the applica-
tion form to reflect the type of evidence he was seeking and the proper 
district, and took it and his affidavit to the residence of a judge. He 
told the judge of the problem with the form, and that the warrant 
would have to be checked. The judge told the officer that he would 
make, and then that he had made, the requisite changes to the warrant 
form, and he issued the warrant. The officer then executed the war-
rant, found incriminating evidence, and arrested the defendant Shep-
pard. At a suppression hearing, the defendant's attorney argued that 
since the judge had not changed the printed text of the warrant form, 
which thus still indicated it was a warrant for "controlled substances," 
the officers had executed a warrant for which there was not probable 
cause, and therefore the evidence had been seized in violation of the 
fourth amendment and must be suppressed. 53 
The Massachusetts trial court admitted the evidence based on the 
officer's objectively reasonable good faith reliance on the warrant, and 
the defendant was convicted at trial. 54 On appeal, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court refused to adopt the proposed good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule. 55 In the Supreme Court, the case fell 
within the new rule approved the same day in Leon, and the Court 
affirmed Sheppard's conviction. 56 The Court examined the record and 
concluded that since the officer told the judge what changes would 
need to be made to the warrant form, the judge said he would make 
them, the officer watched the judge make changes to the form, and the 
judge told the officer the warrant was now properly altered, it was 
reasonable for the officer to rely on that warrant and to carry out the 
search.57 The Court asserted that "there is little reason why [the 
officer] should be expected to disregard assurances that everything is 
all right, especially when he has alerted the judge t.o the potential 
52. 468 U.S. 981 (1984). 
53. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 984-87. 
54. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 987. 
55. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 987. 
56. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 987-88. 
57. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 986 n.3, 989. 
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problems."58 Therefore the evidence produced by the warrant was ad-
missible and the conviction could stand. 
The rule that emerges from these two decisions focuses on deter-
rence of police misconduct. The Court's idea of deterrence is a narrow 
one: "If exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequently 
invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect, ... it must alter the 
behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their 
departments."59 The Court argued that even if the exclusionary rule 
does deter some police misconduct, "it cannot be expected, and should 
not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activ-
ity. "60 Quoting its earlier decision in Michigan v. Tucker, 61 the Court 
wrote: 
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that 
the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct 
which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit 
evidence gained as a r~ult of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in 
those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a 
greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official 
action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence ra-
tionale loses much of its force. 62 
While the Supreme Court desires deterrence, the next Part of this 
Note argues that state and lower federal courts, in applying the good 
faith exception, have often misunderstood the new rule, interpreting it 
in ways that sanction admitting evidence obtained via conduct that is 
both deterrable and worthy of deterrence. 
II. EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS OF ERROR 
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule crafted in Leon is 
now an often-invoked tenet of criminal procedure doctrine. It has 
been applied in every circuit and adopted by many states. 63 The expe-
58. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 990. In this situation, even if the officer had carefully read the 
warrant and noticed that the text still contained the "controlled substances" language, it would 
be reasonable for him to assume that the magistrate had seen that text and judged the warrant 
sufficient nevertheless. 
59. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984). Justice White dismissed as "specula-
tive" the argument that suppression of evidence tainted by technical errors in police procedure 
would deter such errors in the future. Justice White also dismissed as speculative the argument 
that if the police were to learn that their affidavits, even if approved by magistrates, must over-
come possible further judicial review, they would raise their own standards for their affidavits. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 918. 
60. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919. 
61. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
62. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)). 
63. See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. But-
ler, 763 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1987); Gluck v. 
United States, 771 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Edwards, 798 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Gant, 759 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292 
(6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hornick, 815 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Sager, 
743 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1986); United 
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rience with the doctrine over the past six years allows an investigation 
of its application by state and lower federal courts that may discern 
systematic problems or tendencies caused by the rule as formulated in 
Leon. This Part sets forth a series of errors found in an unstructured 
search of applications of the Leon rule. 64 All of the examples reveal 
conceptual misunderstandings by the applying courts of the good faith 
exception. Most are application errors that resulted in admittance of 
evidence that, under Leon, should not have been admitted. Some of 
the cases discussed below, while revealing fundamental misunder-
standings of Leon by the lower courts, involve evidence that properly 
was admitted on grounds independent of the misapplied Leon rule. 
These cases, nevertheless, illustrate the prevalence, and the systemic 
underpinnµigs, of misunderstandings of the good faith exception. 
After first setting forth two examples representative of basic mis-
conceptions of the Leon rule, this Part considers several types of appli-
cation errors in more detail. They are: cases where officers seeking, 
obtaining, and executing warrants had no authority to do so; cases 
involving searches pursuant to overbroad warrants; decisions validat-
ing warrants under Leon by relying on the subjective knowledge of the 
executing officers to limit the scope of the searches; and cases admit-
ting evidence via Leon where the evidence was obtained using facially 
deficient warrants. 
A. Two General Examples 
The following two cases are illustrative of the basic misconceptions 
that lead to errors by lower courts when applying the good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule. The first case presents a subjective 
good faith/objectively reasonable reliance confusion; the second, a 
sanctioning of ignorance beyond that of a reasonably well-trained 
officer. 
States v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477 (11th 
Cir. 1985); Sadie v. State, 488 So. 2d 1368 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); State v. Edwards, 154 Ariz. 8, 
739 P.2d 1325 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Stewart v. State, 289 Ark. 272, 711 S.W.2d 787 (1986); 
People v. Ruiz, 217 Cal. App. 3d 574, 265 Cal. Rptr. 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Moise, 
522 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Wood, 457 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1984). 
64. The research underlying this Note did not, of course, tum up only erroneous applications 
of the good faith exception. For examples of proper applications in the face of difficult fact 
situations, see United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926 (6th Cir. 1990) (While searching pursuant 
to a warrant, the executing officers learned that the same premises had just been searched via 
consent and no evidence had been found. The court ruled that the officers must then have re· 
turned to the magistrate for a new finding of probable cause before continuing the warrant 
search; no good faith exception on these facts.); United States v. Collins, 830 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 
1987) (officers reckless in preparing their affidavit; suppressed); United States v. Reivich, 610 F. 
Supp. 538, 545 (W.D. Mo. 1985) ("By failing to include the information regarding inducements 
offered [the informants] for their information [the officer preparing the affidavit] displayed, at the 
very least, reckless disregard for the truth of said affidavit."); People v. Rivera, 190 Cal. App. 3d 
1591, 236 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1987) (affidavit so lacked a showing of probable cause that it was 
unreasonable for the officers to rely on it). 
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United States v. Giancarli65 involved a telephone warrant.66 Cole-
man Ramsey, an agent for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), re-
ceived information late at night about a cocaine lab in a house in 
Miami. Wanting to proceed against the illegal lab but unable to meet 
a magistrate in person, he telephoned the duty magistrate and got au-
thorization to search the house. The magistrate neglected to swear 
Agent Ramsey before taking down the facts that supported his prob-
able cause determination, but neither man noticed this error. When 
the agent returned the warrant to the magistrate the next morning, he 
brought the lack of swearing to the magistrate's attention and was 
then sworn. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, alleging 
that the warrant was improper because the affiant had not sworn to 
the truth of his report. 67 The district court denied the suppression 
motion on two grounds: the Leon good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule and a rule excusing technical violations of Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41. 68 
The court reasoned that because Agent Ramsey "was unaware of 
the lack of swearing at the time of the warrant application, ... [h]is 
reliance upon the facial validity of the warrant was· objectively reason-
able. "69 But it is impossible that Ramsey reasonably was unaware that 
he had not been sworn by the magistrate. Leon made clear that sub-
jective good faith, an honest belief that one has made no error, is insuf-
ficient to satisfy the new exception. 70 If Agent Ramsey had thought 
about the question, he would have been aware that he had not been 
sworn. That he did not think about the question does not validate his 
reliance on the warrant. Excusing Agent Ramsey's mistake on a good 
65. 617 F. Supp. 551 (S.D. Fla. 1985). 
66. FEo. R. CRIM. P. 4l(c)(2) provides for a "Warrant upon oral testimony" to encourage 
officers to seek authorization for their actions despite a need to proceed rapidly with the search. 
The officer telephones a magistrate and reads him the contents of the "duplicate original war-
rant" that the officer has prepared. The magistrate copies down the contents to form the "origi-
nal warrant." After questioning the officer further, if necessary, the magistrate authorizes the 
officer to execute the warrant, using the duplicate original. Both of them sign the magistrate's 
name on their copies of the warrant, and the magistrate notes the exact time of issuance on his 
original copy. 
If possible, the telephone call is to be recorded, otherwise it is to be transcribed by a stenogra-
pher or by the magistrate in longhand. 
Rule 4l(c)(2)(D) states: "When a caller informs the Federal magistrate that the purpose of 
the call is to request a warrant, the Federal magistrate shall immediately place under oath each 
person whose testimony forms a basis of the application and each person applying for that war-
rant." It is this swearing requirement that is at issue in Giancarli. 
67. Giancarli, 617 F. Supp. at 552. In other words, the affiant was not an affiant. 
68. Giancarli, 617 F. Supp. at 552-54. The alternative basis for denial of suppression was a 
rule from United States v. Loyd, 721 F.2d 331, 333 (11th Cir. 1983), adopted from the Ninth 
Circuit's rule set out in United States v. Stefanson, 648 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1981). See also 
United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1975). This rule is discussed infra note 108. 
69. Giancarli, 617 F. Supp. at 553. 
70. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 n.20"(1984) ("We emphasize that the standard 
of reasonableness we adopt is an objective one."). 
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faith exception basis tells Ramsey he need not know he is to be sworn 
when he "swears out an affidavit." He should know this, because it is 
part of Rule 41. A "reasonably well-trained police officer"71 would 
know and would not be excused if he forgot. 
Equally importantly for the Leon rule, this is a police error as well 
as a magisterial one. There is no reason to let the police officer, who 
should know of the swearing duty, ignore the deficiency just because 
the magistrate, whose errors are "undeterrable,"72 also makes the 
same mistake. If the cocaine were suppressed, this officer and his fu-
ture counterparts would understand not just that they must swear out 
the facts to the magistrate, but that they are to take the procedural 
rules seriously. Even the limited notion of deterrence approved by 
Justice White would be served by suppression here, because the 
message to police officers would be a broad one: procedure is impor-
tant, and officers are responsible for knowing and following the rules 
laid down. 
The second flaw in the reasoning here is that the court grounded 
its finding of objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant's "facial 
validity."73 The duplicate original warrant74 that Agent Ramsey 
made out and executed was, on its face, valid. But to call it facially 
valid as a way of justifying his reliance on it seems to miss the point of 
the Supreme Court's exception for facially deficient warrants. That 
exception seems to mean that when the officer has no excuse not to 
have known that the warrant was deficient, the officer may not reason-
ably rely on the warrant. Here, when the officer made out the warrant 
himself and could not reasonably avoid knowing that he had not 
sworn out his statement to the magistrate, arguing that the warrant 
showed no flaw to Agent Ramsey when he read it over adds nothing to 
his reasonableness. The analogue to his failure to take an oath is a 
failure to sign his affidavit, which would be a facial deficiency. The 
court's argument does not support applying the good faith exception 
here, because the reason behind the facial deficiency exception would 
be served by suppression. 75 
The second general example is State v. Wood, 16 in which a Louisi-
71. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. The Supreme Court has not set forth in any detail what a reason· 
ably well-trained officer is expected to know. But expecting an officer to understand the general 
parameters of his authority and details such as that one must be sworn when one "swears out an 
affidavit" seems entirely reasonable. 
72. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. 
73. Giancarli, 617 F. Supp. at 553. 
74. See supra note 66. 
75. The importance of this example is that it reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
good faith exception, not that the technical error involved in this case necessarily merited a 
reversal of the conviction. 
76. 457 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1984). For a discussion of Wood, see Dripps, supra note 12, 
at 931. 
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ana court adopted the Leon good faith exception under its own consti-
tution. Purporting to apply the Leon reasoning, the Louisiana court 
approved "objectively reasonable" reliance on a warrant based on an 
affidavit the court admitted came nowhere near compliance with the 
probable cause standard. The affidavit provided that the affiant be-
lieved "various narcotics, marijuana and other drug paraphernalia, 
and also a 5200 Poulan chain saw with a bow bar" were in defendant's 
house trailer and barn. 77 The basis for this belief was that the affiant 
"received information from two (2) confidential informants that the 
above listed items have been seen at the above location. These two (2) 
informants have found [sic] to be very reliable in past investiga-
tions."78 This affidavit does not come close to establishing either prob-
able cause or a reasonable basis for belief in the existence of probable 
cause.79 
The Louisiana court conceded that the affidavit did not establish 
probable cause, listing the following four reasons. First, nowhere does 
the affidavit state that either the affiant or the confidential informants 
ever saw the listed items on the premises indicated. The affidavit 
"states only that the informants gave information that the items 'were 
seen' without stating who saw them."80 Second, the affidavit estab-
lished no temporal connection between the purported sightings of the 
contraband and the filing of the warrant application. 81 Third, the affi-
davit provided absolutely no basis for determining the reliability of the 
two confidential informants, contrary to probable cause law even after 
the decision in Illinois v. Gates and its "totality of the circumstances" 
test. 82 And finally, "the affidavit provides no facts to connect the 
chain saw to any criminal activity whatsoever."83 
Despite these serious and obvious flaws, the Louisiana court held 
that the affidavit was "not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable .... " 84 
Therefore, under the Leon analysis, the officer's reliance on the war-
rant was reasonable and the evidence was properly admitted. That the 
court could not point to a single element of the affidavit that would 
support any belief in probable cause did not deter it from the conclu-
sion it thought Leon condoned. 85 
77. Wood, 457 So. 2d at 208. 
78. Wood, 457 So. 2d at 208. 
79. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, at ch. 3 passim; see 
also supra note 8. 
80. Wood, 457 So. 2d at 208. 
81. Wood, 457 So. 2d at 208. 
82. 462 U.S. 213 (1983); see also supra note 8. 
83. Wood, 457 So. 2d at 209. 
84. Wood, 457 So. 2d at 210. 
85. Wood, 457 So. 2d at 210. The court attempted to demonstrate that the affidavit was not 
of the "bare bones" variety disparaged by the Leon majority, but can hardly be deemed success-
638 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:625 
The Louisiana court's decision, while purporting to apply and 
adopt Leon's good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, failed to 
understand the new rule. It appears to have been led astray by the 
message sent by Leon to lower courts: minor violations of the fourth 
amendment are to be excused via the new good faith exception. Under 
a proper Leon analysis, the question is whether a reasonably well-
trained officer could maintain an objectively reasonable belief in the 
existence of probable cause based on that affidavit. The proper analy-
sis yields a clear "No," and any other answer produces a contorted 
good faith exception that effectively abolishes the warrant requirement 
by gutting the probable cause standard. State v. Wood is a misapplica-
tion of the Leon principles. 
B. Lack of Authority To Request or Execute a Warrant 
The following cases involve warrants issued to applicants who had 
no legal authority to apply for or execute them. The courts admitted 
the disputed evidence via the good faith exception, holding that the 
applicants reasonably relied on the magistrates' authorizations. These 
are results not condoned by Leon. 
In United States v. Segovia-Melgar, 86 Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) agents obtained a warrant to search an apartment in 
Washington, D.C., culminating a six-month investigation into the 
counterfeiting of green cards and social security cards. Upon search-
ing the apartment, they arrested four defendants for possession of false 
U.S. identification documents. 87 Despite the warrant, these agents had 
no authority to enter or to arrest the defendants. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act88 gives INS agents "the 
power to execute any warrant or other process issued by any officer 
under any law regulating the admission, exclusion, or expulsion of 
aliens."89 INS agents may detain and deport aliens, but these are not 
criminal law enforcement acts.90 Because the warrant in Segovia-Mel-
gar authorized a search for evidence of violations of a criminal stat-
ful in that effort. The court pointed to the fact that there was an allegation that contraband was 
seen at a particular place, and that the informants were alleged to have been "very reliable in past 
investigations." 457 So. 2d at 210. But neither of those factors takes this affidavit out of the 
"bare bones" category. See, e.g., United States v. Barrington, 806 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1986) (war-
rant for motel room drug search said only that affiant "received information from a confidential 
informant" who was "known to Captain Phil Soloman and has provided information in the past 
that has led to arrest and convictions"; because the affidavit did not specify what the information 
was, it was a bare bones affidavit). 
86. 595 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984). 
87. Segovia-Melgar, 595 F. Supp. at 754. 
88. 8 u.s.c. §§ 1101-1525 (1988). 
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(4) (1988). 
90. Segovia-Melgar, 595 F. Supp. at 755-56 (citing Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 
659 F.2d 1211, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1981)). 
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ute,91 the INS agents had no authority to accept and execute it. 
The defendants challenged the admission of the forged documents 
on this basis. While the court admitted the agents had no authority, it 
excused their conduct and denied the suppression motion based on the 
Leon exception. The court considered the exceptions to the good faith 
exception92 and found none of them satisfied.93 It then stated that 
there was no "evidence that either the INS agents or the magistrate 
were aware of any uncertainty as to the authority of the INS agents to 
search for evidence of violations of the False Identification [and] 
Crime Control Act."94 That finding satisfied the court that the good 
faith exception applied to this case. Yet the court's statement means 
that the agents (and the magistrate) were subjectively unaware of their 
lack of authority, while Leon explicitly provides that subjective good 
faith is not enough. 95 If the agents should have known the limits of 
their authority, their actual ignorance will not excuse them. 
The question, then, is whether it was reasonable for the INS agents 
to be unaware that they could not execute process issued for suspected 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States. From one perspec-
tive, the mistake is easily understood. The agents were investigating 
the forging of alien registration cards, so the violations connected logi-
cally with the other duties of the INS. But, especially when they will 
be intruding on citizens' privacy, · government agents should know 
what the law allows and what it forbids. The logical connection was 
not enough to prompt Congress to expand the scope ofINS authority, 
and it is unreasonable for the courts to allow the agents to exceed their 
authority or to be ignorant of the limited circumstances in which they 
have power to search citizens' homes. 
Segovia-Melgar illustrates the impact on the reasoning and reac-
tion of courts when fourth amendment violations occur yet produce 
probative evidence. The court here called this violation "nonculpable" 
and reasoned that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule 
would not be served by suppression.96 Yet this case presents clearly 
deterrable acts by the INS agents. Suppressing the green cards, which 
were the focus of the lengthy investigation, would drive home to those 
agents and their compatriots the limits of their authority and the need 
91. Segovia-Melgar. 595 F. Supp. at 754. The statute is the False Identification and Crime 
Control Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (1988). It nowhere refers to aliens, the conduct of whom 
is the only proper focus of INS agent activity. 
92. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51. 
93. Segovia-Melgar. 595 F. Supp. at 757. 
94. Segovia-Melgar. 595 F. Supp. at 757. 
95. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 n.20 (1984) ("We emphasize that the standard 
of reasonableness we adopt is an objective one."). 
96. Segovia-Melgar, 595 F. Supp. at 758. 
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for them to know the law regulating their activities.97 Invasion of citi-
zen privacy with all the force of government behind the agents is a 
serious undertaking, and such intrusions based upon insufficient au-
thority threaten the values embedded in the fourth amendment. By 
misapplying the good faith exception in this way, the court is encour-
aging officers to remain ignorant of their authority. This was not a 
"nonculpable" violation, and it was not nondeterrable. 
The Ninth Circuit evidenced the same misunderstanding of the 
Leon rule in United States v. Luk, 98 which involved a Department of 
Commerce agent who, like the INS agents in Segovia-Me/gar, sought, 
obtained, and executed a search warrant in ignorance of her lack of 
authority to carry out any of these steps. At the time she obtained and 
executed the warrant to search Luk's home for evidence of illegal ex-
port activities, agent Doris Koplick was not a "federal law enforce-
ment officer" for the purposes of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
41(a), which provides: "A search warrant authorized by this rule may 
be issued by a federal magistrate . . . upon request of a federal law 
enforcement officer or an attorney for the government."99 The major-
ity in Luk found the Rule 41 violation a technical one, excusable 
under its own rule for such violations.100 Additionally, the majority 
stated that even if it found the violation one requiring suppression in a 
normal case, here the good faith exception saved the evidence. This 
ruling reveals a misunderstanding of the Leon rule. 
That Agent Koplick conferred with an Assistant United States At-
torney during her investigation and received no warning from either 
that prosecutor or the magistrate who issued the warrant does not 
make her reliance reasonable. The dissent argued: 
There is a very strong policy basis for limitations upon the authority 
to request a search warrant .... Giving the authority to intrude upon a 
citizen's home is a solemn and serious act. Where the power of the gov-
ernment is to be marshalled to command entry into a private home - to 
command, and, if not obeyed, to break, and enter the close - is a heavy 
exercise of public process; it ought to require ... strict compliance with 
the Constitution, with governing statutes and with rules of implementa-
tion. This goes for issuance no less than execution. Our rules aim to 
assure us not only that there is a public need to invade, but that execu-
tion of that duty is entrusted only to those special government officers 
who are seasoned, informed about the business of entry, search and 
97. See Co=ent, supra note 33, at 1033-49 (study detailing deterrent and educational effect 
of suppression on Chicago narcotics officers). 
98. 859 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1988). 
99. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a). 
100. Luk, 859 F.2d at 673. The court, reviewing the magistrate's findings de novo, decided 
that "[t]he record does not show either that the actual request for the warrant came from Assis-
tant United States Attorney Rossbacher or that Rossbacher asked the magistrate to issue the 
warrant to Agent Koplick." Id. On the rule for technical violations of Rule 41, see infra note 
108. 
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seizure, and who have been explicitly designated by the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States.101 
The majority claimed that Judge Poole, dissenting, had missed the 
issue: "Even if Koplick should have known that she had no authority 
to request the search warrant, it is not clear that she should be pre-
sumed to have known that [the Assistant United States Attorney's] 
directions and his actions did not satisfy the Rule 41 request require-
ment." 102 But if she should have known about her lack of authority to 
request a warrant, the prosecutor's assurances and the magistrate's in-
attention do not excuse her ignorance. She showed good faith, cer-
tainly, but that is not enough under Leon. It seems reasonable for her 
to rely on the magistrate for close rulings on the difficult question of 
probable cause, and the good faith exception exists to sanction pre-
cisely that type of reliance. The question of Koplick's statutory au-
thority to request a warrant, however, is different. It has a clear, 
unambiguous answer that relates to the contours of Agent Koplick's 
own job. It is thoroughly reasonable to expect her to know the limits 
of her own authority and therefore thoroughly unreasonable to excuse 
her ignorance in this case. 
Justice White, in Leon, wrote that "[i]t is necessary to consider the 
objective reasonableness, not only of the officers who eventually exe-
cuted a warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained 
it .... " 103 Koplick's mistake tainted the warrant, so the proper execu-
tion will not save it. Suppression in such a case will deter such errors 
in the future. 
United States v. Freeman 104 is the most recent example of misap-
plication of the good faith exception to warrants issued to officers inel-
igible to accept them, and it displays the same misunderstanding of the 
good faith exception seen in Segovia-Melgar and Luk. The situation in 
Freeman was as follows. Thomas Ley, a special agent with the Mis-
souri Department of Revenue but not a "peace officer" within the 
meaning of the Missouri statutes authorizing applications for search 
warrants, 105 applied for, received, and executed a warrant to search 
101. Luk, 859 F.2d at 680-81 (Poole, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also United States 
v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692, 698 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Leon does not apply to search warrants issued to 
people who are not permitted to obtain such warrants"). 
102. Luk, 859 F.2d at 676. Given the majority's finding that there was no evidence to sup-
port the magistrate's finding that the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) requested the 
warrant, its later argument that Agent Koplick reasonably could assume that the AUSA's ac-
tions satisfied the Rule 41 requirements does not follow. That the AUSA thought the warrant 
should issue, and should issue to Koplick, cannot provide Koplick a basis for a reasonable belief 
that Rule 41 was satisfied. 
103. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 n.24 (1984). 
104. 897 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1990). 
105. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 542.261, .276.1 (1986). 
Section 542.276.1 reads: "Any peace officer or prosecuting attorney may make application 
under section 542.271 for the issuance of a search warrant." 
Section 542.261 defines "peace officer'' as follows: "As used in sections 542.261 to 542.296 
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the defendant's premises. He found license plates that had been ille-
gally altered and stolen car parts. Agent Ley did not inform the state 
court judge reviewing the warrant application that he was not a "peace 
officer," and the form he signed stated that he was such an officer.106 
At the ensuing suppression hearing, Ley's testimony was ambiguous 
on the question whether he had known of the extent of his authority to 
apply for and execute a search warrant. 10 7 
The Eighth Circuit, after some extended preliminary observa-
tions, 108 concluded that "the magistrate found that Ley, although un-
authorized to apply for and execute a search warrant, carried out the 
application and execution in good faith, believing he possessed author-
ity to do so. This finding is not clearly erroneous."109 While that fac-
tual finding likely was not "clearly erroneous," the test applied by the 
magistrate is obviously one of subjective good faith and therefore the 
ruling on the good faith exception is flawed. That Agent Ley thought 
he had authority to apply for a warrant is insufficient under Leon, and 
an officer may reasonably be expected to know the contours of his job 
authoriZation. By sanctioning the faulty analysis of the magistrate and 
district court, the Eighth Circuit in Freeman misapplied the good faith 
exception. 
and section 542.301, the term 'peace officer' means a police officer, member of the highway patrol 
to the extent otherwise permitted by law to conduct searches, sheriff or deputy sheriff." 
106. As noted in Freeman, 897 F.2d at 347 n.3 (quoting Appellant's Appendix at 7): 
[T]he return and inventory form completed by Ley read in part: "I, Thomas F. Ley, 
being a peace officer within and for the aforesaid County, to-wit: St. Charles, do hereby 
make return to the above and within warrant as follows .... " 
107. His testimony was: "I was not familiar. I didn't know that I could carry out the func· 
tion of not making a return on a search warrant. That's all I can testify to." Freeman, 897 F.2d 
at 347 (quoting Motion Hearing Transcript at 9). 
108. The central ground for affirming the defendant's conviction was not the application of 
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, but rather the invocation of another doctrine 
that denies the significance of minor procedural errors in the application, issuance, or execution 
of search warrants. 
This doctrine, based on United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1975), is sometimes 
called the fundamentaVnonfundamental test. See United States v. Luk, 859 F.2d 667, 671 (9th 
Cir. 1988) ("Only a 'fundamental' violation of[FED. R. CRIM. P.] 41 requires automatic suppres-
sion, and a violation is 'fundamental' only where it, in effect, renders the search unconstitutional 
under traditional fourth amendment standards. Violations of Rule 41 which do not arise to 
constitutional error are classified as 'non-fundamental.' "); Freeman, 897 F.2d at 350. Where a 
procedural or technical violation is deemed "non-fundamental," suppression is warranted only 
when "(1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would 
not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional 
and deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule." Burke, 517 F.2d at 386-87 (footnote omit-
ted). 
The Freeman court, finding the lack of authority a "nonfundamental" error, applied the 
Burke test and ruled that the defendant had suffered neither prejudice nor a constitutional viola-
tion. Therefore the evidence was not suppressed. 897 F.2d at 350. This analysis is not univer-
sally accepted, see United States v. Shorter, 600 F.2d 585, 588-89 (6th Cir. 1970); United States 
v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692, 698 (9th Cir. 1986), but regardless of the alternative grounds offered by 
the court in Freeman, the analytical error discussed in the text to follow remains. 
109. Freeman, 897 F.2d at 350. 
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These cases110 involve situations where the officers requesting the 
warrants had no authority to do so. The warrants issued to govern-
ment officials whom the democratic process had not picked out as eli-
gible to invade citizens' privacy. That is a result not sanctioned by the 
Leon exception. 
C. Overbroad Warrants 
This section considers a type of application mistake that is increas-
ingly uncommon, but nevertheless instructive to examine. Six federal 
circuits have considered whether the good faith exception should ap-
ply to a warrant that is overbroad on its face. Three have indicated 
that it can be reasonable for an officer to rely on such a warrant. The 
balance of the circuits presented with the question have ruled that 
such reliance is not reasonable. This section argues that the latter 
reading of Leon is correct. 
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Accardo 111 was 
the first appellate decision approving reliance on an overbroad war-
rant. The court reversed a 1982 suppression order that had been based 
on the overbreadth of a warrant authorizing a search for "all corpo-
rate records," finding the officer's reliance reasonable under the cir-
cumstances shown in the record. 112 The case was, however, remanded 
for a hearing on the good faith question. 113 A more recent Second 
Circuit decision, United States v. Buck, 114 held that a warrant it found 
overbroad was saved by the good faith exception for two reasons. 
First, the record showed a good deal of effort by the officers to comply 
with the fourth amendment. 115 This fact, showing subjective good 
faith, combined with what the court called the "unsettled" condition 
of the particularity law in the circuit when the events occurred, con-
vinced the court that it was reasonable for the officers to rely on the 
warrant authorizing them "to seize any papers, things or property of 
any kind relating to previously described crime."116 The third exam-
ple is an Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Faul. 117 The defendant 
in Faul claimed that the warrant involved was overbroad, and the 
court disagreed. But in a footnote it stated that "even if the warrant 
were invalid," the good faith exception would save the evidence.118 
110. United States v. Segovia-Melgar, 595 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984); United States v. Luk, 
859 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1988); and United States v. Freeman, 897 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1990); see 
also United States v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1986). 
111. 749 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 949 (1985); 
112. Accardo, 749 F.2d at 1481. 
113. Accardo, 749 F.ld at 1481. 
114. 813 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1987). 
115. Buck, 813 F.2d at 592-93. 
116. Buck, 813 F.2d at 590. 
117. 748 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1984). 
118. Faul, 748 F.2d at 1220 n.11. 
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These interpretatfons of Leon are important for their acceptance of the 
idea that officers could rely on an overbroad warrant. 119 Despite the 
Second Circuit's warning in Buck that police officers would no longer 
be able to rely on warrants as overbroad as the one there in question, it 
did not rule out finding reliance on other warrants less obviously over-
broad to be reasonable. 
These rulings seem wrong. Because one of the exceptions to the 
good faith exception concerns warrants that are facially deficient, a 
warrant that is overbroad cannot be a basis for reasonable reliance.120 
Officers must read the warrant prior to executing it, and if they review 
one that authorizes a general search for "any things relating to previ-
ously described crimes," there is no reason to let them carry out that 
search. It is not unreasonable to expect the police to know that the 
fourth amendment requires warrants particularly to describe the place 
to be searched and the things to be seized. Suppression in these cases 
will impress on the police the importance of reading the warrant and 
considering how broad their authorization actually is. Neither of 
these actions require any burdensome amount of time and, as a matter 
of sound policy, both should be done regularly. 
In contrast to the rulings in the above cases, three other circuits 
have found that a "reasonably well-trained officer should know that a 
warrant must provide guidelines for determining what evidence may 
be seized."121 The First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have each agreed 
on the rule that reliance on facially overbroad warrants is not reason-
able.122 The rule is limited somewhat by the efforts of the police to get 
reassurance from the issuing magistrate about the technical sufficiency 
of the warrant. If, as in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 123 the officer ques-
tions the magistrate about the propriety of the warrant as to a specific 
matter, it will be reasonable for her to rely on the warrant, given the 
Supreme Court's statement that "[i]n the ordinary case, an officer can-
not be expected to question the magistrate's ... judgment that the 
form of the warrant is technically sufficient."124 But as the Ninth Cir-
cuit properly noted in United States v. Spilotro, when "a more precise 
119. These cases may have little precedential value even in their own circuits, for the com-
ments in Faul are mere dicta, Accardo resulted in a remand for further fact finding, and Buck 
announced that after publication of that decision, "police officers may no longer invoke the rea-
sonable-reliance exception to the exclusionary rule when they attempt to introduce as evidence 
the fruits of searches undertaken on the basis of warrants containing only a catch-all description 
of the property to be seized." 813 F.2d at 593 n.2. Yet, as noted in the text, none shied from the 
notion that overbroad warrants could reasonably be relied upon. 
120. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). 
121. United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 609 (10th Cir. 1988). 
122. See United States v. Fucillo, 808 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Spilotro, 800 
F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1988). 
123. 468 U.S. 981 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 52-58 (discussing Sheppard). 
124. Leon, 468 U.S. at 921. 
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description of the items sought was possible,"125 the officer may not 
rely on the general warrant. 
The trend in these cases clearly is toward acceptance of the view 
that facially overbroad warrants may not be saved by the good faith 
exception.126 That is the proper direction, because it is the reading of 
Leon and Sheppard that is most faithful to the stated purposes of the 
rule. It avoids the weakness of the opposite position, which relies too 
much on the quote in Leon from Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in 
Stone v. Powell: "Once the warrant issues, there is literally nothing 
more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law."127 A 
fuller examination of the Leon opinion reveals the active role the 
Court expects police officers to play, before and after the warrant 
issues.128 
D. The Subjective Knowledge of the Executing Officers 
The fourth amendment requires that search warrants "particularly 
describe[]" what is to be seized and where it is to be found. The fol-
lowing cases treat the question whether an officer may save, via the 
good faith exception, the validity of a warrant that is insufficiently par-
ticular on its face by her independent knowledge of the intended scope 
of the warrant. 
In United States v. Kepner, 129 the Third Circuit held that when an 
officer's affidavit contains more particular information about what evi-
dence should be seized than the warrant does, the fact that the affiant 
executes the warrant will save it from failing for overbreadth. Kepner 
involved an investigation into the payment of benefits to a union officer 
in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act. 130 The affidavit in support of the 
application for a warrant to search the defendant's apartment related 
the connection between what was likely to be found there and the sus-
pected violations. The application form, however, which was tran-
scribed onto the warrant, neglected to establish that connection. The 
125. Spi/otro, 800 F.2d at 964. The warrant contained no specific identification of the alleged 
criminal activities in connection with which the items were sought. The only reference was to 
evidence showing violation of any one of thirteen statutes, some of which were general. 
126. But see United States v. Burke, 718 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Burke admitted 
evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant that the Ninth Circuit found overbroad (see Center Art 
Galleries-Hawaii, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1989)), reasoning that since the 
Second Circuit in its 1987 decision in United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1987) ruled 
that the particularity Jaw in the Circuit was "ambiguous" up to that point, the warrants issued in 
1985 were still protected by that ruling. 
127. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring), quoted in United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. "897, 921 (1984). 
128. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23; see also Goldstein, supra note 44, at 1183-87 (discussing short-
comings of magistrates in many jurisdictions). 
129. 843 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1988). 
130. Kepner, 843 F.2d at 756-57. The Taft-Hartley Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 
(1988). Kepner involved a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186. 
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affiant, Agent Chance, led the team executing the warrant, and he 
carefully controlled the execution of the search to keep it within the 
narrower scope that he understood the affidavit to have established.131 
In finding that it would still admit the evidence, despite the possible 
overbreadth of the warrant, the court relied on the knowledge of 
Agent Chance to show that the warrant in fact did not authorize too 
broad a search.132 The court concluded that, "since ... the search was 
conducted with great care so as not to exceed the perceived scope of 
the warrant, there is no basis for a finding of bad faith in the execution 
of the warrant."133 Using this subjective knowledge of the affiant to 
save a warrant misapplies the Leon rule because the exception is only 
for objectively reasonable reliance. 
As a contrast that will help make this point, consider United States 
v. Fuccillo 134 and Russell v. United States. 135 The First Circuit in Fuc-
cillo ruled that officers who knew that a warrant could be made more 
particular than it had been could not reasonably rely on that warrant. 
In applying for warrants to search warehouses and retail outlets for 
stolen women's clothing, the affiant in Fuccillo failed to inform the 
magistrate of factors known to him which would have properly limited 
his search if incorporated into the warrant. Instead the officers exe-
cuted a facially overbroad warrant and seized substantial quantities of 
material for which they had presented no probable cause in their war-
rant application.136 Russell, on the other hand, approved reliance by 
the executing officer on his independent knowledge of the scope of a 
warrant to limit his search. Russell involved a mistake in issuing the 
warrant, so that the officer, upon executing it, discovered that the de-
tailed description of the items to be seized that was in only one part of 
the affidavit was not attached to the warrant as intended by the magis-
trate. The officer, however, knew the intended scope of the warrant 
and confined his search to the items actually mentioned in that part of 
131. Kepner, 843 F.2d at 757. The affidavit read: "24. Further, I have probable cause to 
believe that such search will result in the seizure of personal items of Kepner such as clothing, 
documents, records, diaries, and correspondence that establish his use and control of the condo-
minium unit as well as his illegal receipt of the prohibited benefits." 843 F.2d at 757. "The 
accompanying application form, however, used somewhat broader language, referring merely to 
the 'documents, records and personal effects of Thomas Kepner, Mary Brown, and Robert 
Brown.' " 843 F.2'd at 757. The warrant contained the latter, broad language. 
132. The court held that the warrant was sufficiently particular with respect to one defendant 
and did not decide the question with respect to the other since the government had conceded 
overbreadth there. Kepner, 843 F.2d at 762-63. But the court also assumed that the warrant had 
been overbroad, as its conclusion shows. "Whether because the warrant was valid, or because it 
was executed in good faith, allowing the testimony in this case is not likely to encourage future 
misconduct by the police." 843 F.2d at 764. 
133. Kepner, 843 F.2d at 764. 
134. 808 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1987). 
135. 649 F. Supp. 1402 (N.D. Miss. 1986). 
136. Fucci/lo, 808 F.2d at 176-77. 
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the affidavit.137 In admitting the evidence via the good faith exception, 
the court was obviously impressed with the subjective good faith of the 
officer.13s 
The situation in Kepner is analogous to those in Fuccillo and Rus-
sell. In each, the courts considered what effect an officer's knowledge 
of details not present in the warrant would have on the validity of that 
warrant. The question is whether Leon condones admitting evidence 
obtained under a warrant when that warrant itself was overbroad but 
the affiant knew what the magistrate had intended. 
One could argue that the answer depends on the results of the case, 
as possibly the results in Kepner and Fuccillo turned on the fact that in 
Kepner the affiant oversaw the execution and in Fuccillo most of the 
executing officers lacked the limiting knowledge of the affiant and so 
seized irrelevant and unintended evidence.139 But for two reasons, the 
subjective knowledge of the affiant should not cure a warrant defect 
even when the affiant is the executing officer. 
First, Leon emphasizes the objective nature of the reasonable reli-
ance test. Whether the officer thought the warrant complied with the 
fourth amendment is not the correct inquiry under this rule. Rather, 
the question is whether it was understandable for a reasonably well-
trained officer to think that these actions comported with the fourth 
amendment. 140 Under this analysis, the thoughts of the executing of-
ficer (absent bad faith)141 should be irrelevant to the determination of 
what it was reasonable for an officer to do. Therefore the inquiry that 
validated the searches in Kepner and Russell should have stopped once 
a lack of bad faith was found. 
Second, if the rule is interpreted to approve reliance on the subjec-
tive knowledge of the executing officers, it will foster the creation of 
warrants for which probable cause does not exist. In all three of these 
cases, the warrants on their faces would not have guided an agent who 
lacked the affiants' particular knowledge. All of these warrants, not 
just that in Fuccillo, easily could have been executed by officers other 
than the affiants, 142 and invasions of protected rights such as those in 
Fuccillo could have occurred. On this point, the Supreme Court has 
stated that the particularity requirement "makes general searches 
under [warrants] impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing 
under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, noth-
137. Russell, 649 F. Supp. at 1404. 
138. Russell, 649 F. Supp. at 1408. 
139. See Kepner, 843 F.2d at 757; Fuccillo, 634 F. Supp. at 362-63. 
140. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). See United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 
137, 140 (9th Cir. 1988) ("An obviously deficient affidavit cannot be cured by an officer's later 
testimony on his subjective intentions or knowledge."); United States v. Burke, 613 F. Supp. 576 
(N.D. Ga. 1985). 
141. See Burkoll', Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 70 (1982). 
142. See infra note 149 (discussion of warrants executed by officers other than the affiant). 
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ing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant."143 
The situations in both Kepner and Russell left substantial discretion to 
the executing officers, and for that reason a rule that fosters creation of 
invalid warrants is an imprudent one. 
Certainly courts could adopt the rule noted above, in which the 
search is valid if the executing officer properly curtails his search based 
on his knowledge of its intended scope, and invalid if the search ex-
ceeds the intended bounds. But such a rule would lead, indirectly but 
with certainty, to the creation of more invalid warrants than the rule 
favored here. If officers knew that overbroad warrants would never 
provide evidence with which to get a conviction, they would not exe-
cute warrants that they knew or suspected to be overbroad. Instead, 
they would return to the magistrate for a properly drawn version. 
With the rule favored here, fewer overbroad warrants would be exe-
cuted partly because fewer overbroad warrants would ever be issued. 
If overbroad warrants were simply not issued, then they could not be 
executed by officers lacking the limiting instructions meant to be in-
cluded on the face of the warrants. Magistrates who were corrected by 
officers returning with overbroad warrants would learn in the process 
and would less often approve overbroad warrants in the future. And 
.officers who received warrants they suspected were overbroad would, 
given the exclusionary sanction as a deterrent, focus on the scope of 
the authorization given on the face of the warrant. 
Because admitting the fruits of overbroad warrants if properly exe-
cuted would lead to more fourth amendment violations than other-
wise, and because suppression in these cases would teach officers a 
simple rule - they must have the proper authorization and limitation 
in the warrant or attached to it - a rule against the validation of 
facially overbroad warrants by the subjective limiting knowledge of 
the executing officers is the better course. This consideration, com-
bined with Leon's teaching that a subjective inquiry is insufficient to 
provide the "good faith" needed, leads to the conclusion that suppres-
sion is appropriate in these cases. 
The cases in this section reveal an error in interpretation of United 
States v. Leon 144 in that lower courts are impressed with the subjective 
good faith of the executing officers. Leon instructs the courts that this 
subjective good faith is irrelevant.145 The courts succumb to this error 
both because the obvious good faith of the officers seems to satisfy the 
"good faith" exception and because the effects of the violations seem 
so minor compared to the costs of excluding the evidence. 
143. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), quoted in United States v. Fuccillo, 
634 F. Supp. 358, 360 (D. Mass. 1986). 
144. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
145. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n.20. 
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E. Facially Deficient Warrants 
One of the exceptions to the good faith exception is for warrants 
"so facially deficient - i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be 
searched or the things to be seized - that the executing officers cannot 
reasonably presume it to be valid."146 In the following cases, courts 
decided that evidence obtained pursuant to facially deficient warrants 
would be admissible via the Leon good faith exception. 
The appeal in United States v. Bonner 147 involved a warrant to 
search a residence for evidence of drug use. The magistrate found 
probable cause and issued a warrant that described the property and 
residence in some detail. Having sent the officers off with the warrant, 
however, the magistrate realized he had omitted the address of the 
premises to be searched. He issued a second warrant with the address 
included and sent it to the DEA agents who were waiting for it at the 
search site, having halted their search upon hearing from the magis-
trate that they needed a different warrant. 148 One issue on appeal 
from the convictions for amphetamine manufacture was the propriety 
of admitting into evidence the fruits of the search under the first war-
rant. The panel split on the question of the validity of the warrant 
without the address, 149 but agreed that in any event the evidence was 
saved by the good faith exception. While the majority noted the appli-
cation of the Leon rule in fairly cursory fashion, the dissent followed 
the proper reasoning almost to its correct conclusion. 
The dissenting judge first observed that since the executing officers 
could not, from the face of the first warrant, have "deduce[d] with 
reasonable certainty even the state or municipality in which the prem-
ises authorized to be searched were located, ... " 150 the first warrant 
seemed to fall within the exception to the good faith exception for 
facially deficient warrants. Despite that exception in Leon, 151 how-
ever, the dissenting judge in Bonner decided that as the facts in Leon's 
146. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; see also supra text accompanying notes 50-51. 
147. 808 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1986). 
148. Bonner, 808 F.2d at 865-66. 
149. Judges Torruella and Bownes ruled that the warrant's particular description of the 
premises to be searched, complete with "Bonner" on the mailbox in front of the house, and the 
familiarity of the executing officers with the premises from their surveillance efforts on the case, 
provided sufficient particularity under the fourth amendment. Bonner, 808 F.2d at 866-67. 
Judge Carter, in dissent, correctly argued that the warrant was insufficiently particular: 
A magistrate's assumptions, if we may assume that they were in fact made, as to the identity 
of the officers who will execute a warrant or as to what particular knowledge such officers 
may have as to the identity of the property intended by the officer applying for the warrant 
to be searched is not in logic or Jaw an adequate substitute for the safeguard of a facially 
sufficient warrant. In pragmatic terms, such assumptions before or after the fact of execu-
tion of the warrant are Jame and ineffective safeguards. 
808 F.2d at 870 (Carter, J., dissenting); see also In re Lafayette Academy, Inc. 610 F.2d l, 4-5 
(1st Cir. 1979). 
150. Bonner, 808 F.2d at 870 (Carter, J., dissenting). 
151. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). 
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companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 152 were "nearly identi-
cal"153 to the operative facts in Bonner, the applic~tion of the good 
faith exception in Sheppard governed the case before him. 
Contrary to the dissent's conclusion in Bonner, the facts from 
Sheppard are not "nearly identical" with those in Bonner. In Shep-
pard, the officer applying for the warrant pointed out the facial inva-
lidity problems to the issuing judge and was assured, after changes had 
been made to the warrant form, that none of those particularity 
problems remained. 154 In contrast, the officers in Bonner did not point 
out to the issuing magistrate any specific flaws in their warrant appli-
cation and received no specific assurances from the magistrate about 
the sufficiency of the warrant despite any perceived problems. Cer-
tainly the fact that the magistrate issued the warrant was a general 
assurance that the officers had a valid instrument. But Leon expressly 
held that the mere fact of issuance of a warrant would not justify reli-
ance by the executing officers. 155 It is the purpose of the facial defi-
ciency exception-to-the-exception to force some assessment of the 
sufficiency of the warrant by the executing officers even after the war-
rant has been approved by a magistrate. In Sheppard, even when the 
executing officer re-read the warrant after it had been signed by the 
magistrate and found some remaining references to "controlled sub-
stances," he reasonably could have assumed that the warrant as modi-
fied by the magistrate was sufficient under the fourth amendment 
because exactly those fears had been addressed by the magistrate when 
the officer brought them to his attention at the application stage. In 
Bonner, the officers should have read the warrant, and if they had 
done so they would have realized that it listed no address. An analogy 
to Sheppard would lie only if the officers in Bonner had approached 
the magistrate with a warrant form they knew had no address for the 
premises to be searched, asked the magistrate if such a warrant was 
sufficient under the fourth amendment, and received specific assur-
ances that indeed the warrant was proper. 156 The facts of Bonner are 
different, and do not come within the good faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule. 
Indeed, the reading of Sheppard found in Bonner would eliminate 
all meaning for the facial deficiency exception to the Leon rule. If 
officers can rely in "good faith" on warrants that are facially invalid 
merely because the warrants have been issued by a magistrate with 
152. 468 U.S. 981 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 52-58. 
153. Bonner. 808 F.2d at 870 (Carter, J., dissenting). 
154. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 986. 
155. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23. 
156. Indeed, even on those facts the warrant would be so facially invalid that no reasonably 
well-trained officer should be able to rely on it, regardless of any assurances offered by any 
magistrate. 
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facial errors intact, then the requirement that the warrant not be 
"facially deficient,"157 set forth by the Leon majority, would be read 
out of the rule. It is neither necessary nor prudent to read Sheppard to 
mandate the result accepted by Bonner, and therefore the evidence in 
Bonner should have been suppressed. 
A case similar to Bonner is State v. Kleinberg. 158 In Kleinberg, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court admitted via the good faith exception evi-
dence seized pursuant to a facially deficient warrant, basing its deci-
sion primarily on affidavits from all the executing officers assuring the 
court that none of them had read the warrant before they executed it 
and found the incriminating evidence at issue in the case. The warrant 
was meant to authorize the search of the defendant's car, but on its 
face it authorized only a search of the defendant himself. The officers 
searched the car, found marijuana, and arrested the defendant. At the 
suppression hearing, the officers all submitted affidavits stating that 
they had not read the warrant before searching the car and therefore 
did not know of the error. The Nebraska Supreme Court found this a 
sufficient showing to satisfy the Leon good faith test, and admitted the 
evidence. , 
The court here confused subjective with objective good faith, as 
this Note has shown other courts have done. Moreover, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court ignored the clear import of the facial deficiency excep-
tion-to-the-exception. Given such a rule, the officers must read each 
warrant before executing it; otherwise they will not be able to catch 
the facially deficient warrants before the illegal searches have been car-
ried out. In Kleinberg, the court was faced with explicit assurances 
that none of the officers had read the warrant before they executed it, 
and to rule as that court did simply ignores and hence destroys the 
protections the Supreme Court meant to leave intact even after 
Leon. 159 
This Part has presented examples of the types of errors found in a 
search of applications of the Leon good faith exception. While not all 
reveal errors that resulted in admission of evidence that would not 
otherwise have been admitted, most of the errors did have that effect. 
The others were noted to show the difficulties the rule poses for the 
state and lower federal courts. The next Part offers an explanation of 
the sources of these errors, and suggests possible remedial steps for the 
future. 
157. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
158. 228 Neb. 128, 421 N.W.2d 450 (1988). 
159. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
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Ill. THE WHY AND WHEREFORE 
You will want cause and effect. All right. 160 
- Thomas Pynchon 
As illustrated in Part II, state and lower federal courts have often 
misapplied the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. This 
Part argues that the high incidence of misapplication can be attrib-
uted, in large part, to the combined effect of three factors: the general 
understanding of the significance of the Leon decision, the label at-
tached to the exclusionary rule exception, and the intricacies of the 
revised rule. It concludes that achieving the goals of the exclusionary 
rule and supporting the values underlying the fourth amendment re-
quires at least some revision and clarification of the Leon rule and 
more likely its outright rejection. 
United States v. Leon pierced what had been thought to be a fixed 
barrier: it admitted some fruits of illegal searches into evidence in the 
trial of the defendant whose fourth amendment rights had been vio-
lated by the search. The flood of commentators did not rail against 
the precise degree of the change in the rule so much as they mourned 
the passing of the inviolability of what had been its essence. 161 The 
essence of Leon is its loosening of the exclusionary rule's strictures to 
some degree at the center of its application,· how much looser is a detail 
swamped by the significance of the central message: a broken barrier 
in fourth amendment jurisprudence. 
This emphasis on the fact of the breakdown of an important bar-
rier rather than on the amount of barrier left intact is evident in Jus-
tice Brennan's dissent in Leon: 162 
It now appears that the Court's victory over the Fourth Amendment is 
complete. That today's decisions represent the piece de resistance of the 
Court's past efforts [to demolish the exclusionary rule] cannot be 
doubted, for today the Court sanctions the use in the prosecution's case-
in-chief of illegally obtained evidence against the individual whose rights 
have been violated - a result that had previously been thought to be 
foreclosed. 163 
Justice Brennan is emphasizing the innovation Leon is to fourth 
amendment doctrine, and for all the majority's assurances that the re-
sult follows from precedent and the narrow purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule, those members of the Court recognized that the central 
significance of the decision was this fundamental shift of which the 
160. T. PYNCHON, GRAVITY'S RAINBOW 663 (1973). 
161. See Prepared Remarks of Yale Kamisar, supra note 7, at 13-16, 20.7 et seq.: Bradley, The 
"Good Faith Exception" Cases: Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287 (1985); 
LaFave, supra note 7, at 910. 
162. Justice Brennan's dissent is to the Court's decisions in the companion cases of United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984). 
163. Leon, 468 U.S. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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dissenters complained.164 
Most commentators also saw Leon's central importance in this 
way. Professor Wayne LaFave noted that "such earlier cases as [Ca-
landra and Stone] ... were all grounded in the postulate that the ex-
clusionary rule, applicable in a criminal prosecution when illegally 
seized evidence is offered, need not also be invoked in certain other 
contexts where no significant additional increment of deterrence is 
deemed likely."165 This general understanding of the Leon decision 
means that when courts, faced with briefs arguing that Leon applies to 
the present case, consider what Leon did, they think about a relaxation 
of the exclusionary rule standards, and only afterwards about the de-
tails of the new rule. This reaction is natural, because it is a true de-
scription of Leon's import. And it is similar to the general 
identifications judges and lawyers make with many important cases. 
But with Leon the popular understanding combined with other factors 
to increase the incidence of application error, fostering the notion that 
Leon meant "minor" fourth· amendment violations were not cause for 
suppression, rather than that only certain minor fourth amendment 
violations were not cause for suppression. 
The second factor adding to the incidence of misapplication is the 
label attached to the new exception. Prior to the Leon case, the idea of 
an exception for good faith efforts by police officers to comply with the 
dictates of the fourth amendment had often been suggested. Justice 
White, dissenting in Stone v. Powell 166 in 1976, argued for a "good 
faith" exception of a type broader than that adopted eight years later 
in Leon. 167 Picking up on this hint, some commentators started writ-
ing about the propriety of a "good faith" exception, not always distin-
guishing between the reasonable reliance type of exception eventually 
adopted in Leon and one that would also excuse an officer's mistaken 
subjective good faith, and not always confining the exception they ad-
vocated to the search warrant context.168 Common to all discussions 
of the proposed exception was the term "good faith," a label with un-
fortunate connotations in light of the version adopted in Leon. Web-
ster's Third New International Dictionary defines "good faith" as "a 
state of mind indicating honesty and lawfulness of purpose."169 That 
164. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. 
165. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 1.3(b}, at 50 (first emphasis added}. For other similar 
observations about the significance of the Leon decision, see Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 
7, at 90. 
166. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
167. White suggested an exception broader than one just for search warrants. Stone, 428 
U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting). 
168. See Carrington, Good Faith Mistakes and the Exclusionary Rule, 2 CRIM. Jus. ETHICS 
35, 38-39 (Summer/Fall 1982); Israel, supra note 14, at 1408-13; Schroeder, Deterring Fourth 
Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1981); Wright, 
Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 736 (1972). 
169. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971). 
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is a subjective notion, and therefore the good faith label is inappropri-
ate for an exception intended to validate only objectively reasonable 
reliance on a search warrant. 
The dynamic that produced the Leon decision included the specu-
lation prior to 1984 about the suggested exception, and all of that dis-
cussion called the proposal a "good faith" exception. So when the 
Court finally sanctioned a version of that idea, the terminology was 
almost unavoidable. The government's brief in Leon acknowledged 
the danger of the subjective connotations of "good faith," explicitly 
disavowing that term and substituting "reasonable mistake" in-
stead.170 But Justice White's majority opinion, while taking great 
pains to emphasize that this exception would be available only for "ob-
jectively reasonable"171 reliance on a search warrant, nevertheless did 
use the "good faith" language. Even if the opinion had not contained 
that term, even if it had stated, "This is not the long-awaited good 
faith exception, this is something fundamentally different, a reasonable 
reliance172 exception," the good faith label would still have attached 
itself to the case in the minds of some of Justice White's audience. But 
outright disavowal of the good faith terminology and exclusive use of 
an alternative label in the opinion would have had a significant effect 
on the way in which state and lower federal courts would understand 
the rule. The label is not only misleading, it points careless courts in 
the more damaging of wrong directions. It encourages them to think 
of the exception as one for well-meaning, honest police officers, rather 
than for well-informed and thinking officers who cannot be expected 
to question a magistrate's judgment on fine points of law. 
The third factor that has fostered misapplication is the intricacy of 
the exclusionary rule now that the reasonable reliance exception has 
been carved out. The "old" exclusionary rule read, essentially, "if the 
evidence is tainted, 173 then suppress it from use in the prosecution's 
case-in-chief." With the Leon exception, the rule became, "if the evi-
dence is tainted, then suppress it from use in the prosecution's case-in-
chief only if doing so will deter police misconduct." This change is 
more significant than it at first seems to be. It introduces new uncer-
tainty about when the rule will apply, producing an excess of discre-
tionary leeway in a rule meant to constrain decisionmakers in the 
criminal justice system. To discern the significance of this change, we 
must consider the workings of the old and new rules as they affect 
lower court decisions. 
170. Brief for the United States at 53-54 n.19, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) 
(No. 82-1771), quoted in Prepared Remarks of Yale Kamisar, supra note 7, at 20.8. 
171. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. 
172. The "reasonable reliance" term is the most suitable of the available alternatives. It has 
been used already by some courts. See, e.g., United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 
1987). . 
173. "Tainted" is shorthand for "seized in violation of the fourth amendment." 
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Rules seemingly can be of two types: firm, fixed dictates that inex-
orably determine outcomes, or mild "rules of thumb" that serve as 
signposts to normally preferred results. 174 But a rule of thumb is, in 
an important sense, not a rule. To follow a rule is to do an act because 
of the rule; one acts not because, in this instance, doing what the rule 
says carries out the purpose of the rule, but just because the rule says 
to do so. As Professor Frederick Schauer explains: 
What makes formalism formal is this very feature: the fact that taking 
rules seriously involves taking their mandates as reasons for decision in-
dependent of the reasons for decision lying behind the rule. If it were 
otherwise, the set of reasons considered by a decisionmaker would be 
congruent with the set of reasons behind the rule, and the rule would add 
nothing to the calculus. Rules therefore supply reasons for action qua 
rules. . . . Refusal to abstract the rule from its reasons is not to have 
rules.175 
Most rule application looks to the aims of the rule as a guide for when 
it should be used, but this process gives the rule-applier an added level 
of discretion over how the rule will work in practice. Often the very 
purpose of having a rule is to control the decisionmaker addressed by 
the rule, to keep him from reconsidering questions already settled by 
the rulemaking body; and therefore a rule that by its very nature is 
loose and unconstraining is ill-suited to the control function it is meant 
to serve.176 According to Professor Schauer: 
[W]hat most arguments for ruleness share is a focus on disabling certain 
classes of decisionmakers from making certain kinds of decisions . 
. . . [T]hose who have jurisdiction to improve on yesterday also have 
jurisdiction to make things worse. [Rules] give up some of the possibility 
of improvement in exchange for guarding against some of the possibility 
of disaster. 177 
Court opinions, and especially Supreme Court opinions, often 
serve as rules. 178 Perhaps their main function as rules is to control the 
decisionmaking of lower courts and other actors in the legal system.179 
174. This is, of course, an oversimplification. If indeed rules can be understood at all, the 
degree of clarity that they each manifest is likely to vary on a continuum, rather than in a clean 
dichotomy. 
175. Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 537 (1988) (footnote omitted). 
176. It is exactly this function of rules which Professor LaFave has in mind when he advo-
cates construction of clear-cut rules to govern police work under the fourth amendment. See 
LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus ''Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Di-
lemma, 1974 SUP. Cr. REv. 127 [hereinafter "Case-by-Case Adjudication'1; LaFave, The Fourth 
Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing ''Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Pm. 
L. REV. 307 (1982); cf. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Pm. L. 
REV. 227 (1984). 
177. Schauer, supra note 175, at 539, 542. Professor Schauer does not claim that rule-based 
decisionmaking is always superior to a reasoned jurisprudence, but he does argue that rules can 
work better in some situations. 
178. See Schauer, Opinions as Rules (Book Review), 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 682, 683, 686 
(1986). 
179. See Ashdown, Good Faith, The Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-Oriented Adjudication 
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Especially in areas as controversial as constitutional criminal proce-
dure, the usual practice is for the Supreme Court to set rules of con-
duct for the police and prosecutors, rules which the lower courts are to 
enforce as strictly as possible. This is a basic tenet of the structure of 
the legal hierarchy, and it is explained in this fashion by Professor 
Schauer: "part of the understanding of many Americans about consti-
tutionalism includes within that understanding the expectation that 
lower court judges, when the mandates of a Supreme Court case are 
linguistically clear, will quite simply 'Just do it.' "180 
Whether or not it is possible for any rule to work in an efficaciously 
formulaic way, 181 the revised exclusionary rule cannot do so. Prior to 
the Leon decision, the exclusionary rule applied without exception to 
illegally obtained evidence the prosecution sought to use in its case-in-
chief. Once a lower court had resolved that the evidence was tainted, 
it could not allow it to be used against the defendant at trial. The new 
exclusionary rule removes that absolute barrier. The new rule has a 
twist: it explicitly looks back at its own purpose. The formalist model 
of rules, on which the control of lower courts is in large part based, 
requires that the rule-applier attempt as much as possible to ignore the 
reasons behind the rule. Abstracting the rule from the reasons behind 
it would here mean ignoring part of the rule itself. To apply the re-
vised rule, a court must consider whether suppression in a given case 
will deter police misconduct in the future. But that process forfeits 
much of the control that motivated the imposition of the rule in the 
first place. The more the application of a rule requires or allows the 
decisionmaker to look to the purpose of the rule, the less constraining 
force the rule will have on the decision. 
Under the old exclusionary rule, doubtless there was some uncer-
in the Criminal Process, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 335, 336 (1983); LaFave, "Case-by-Case 
Adjudication," supra note 176; McGowan, Rulemaking and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 
(1972) (advocating role for police in drafting of rules to control them); cf. Alschuler, supra note 
176. 
180. Schauer, Rules, The Rule of Law, and The Constitution, in 6 CONSTITUTIONAL COM· 
MENTARY 69, 79 (1989). Professor Schauer gives the following example: 
There are obviously cases in which the purposes behind Miranda v. Arizona would not be 
served (and might even be frustrated) by giving a Miranda warning, but we are wary of 
having the cop on the beat make this determination. Instead, something in us wants to say, 
"Just do it" to the police officer, for we fear that the authority to determine whether Mi· 
randa's justifications are applicable in a particular case will in practice result not in a fur· 
therance but in a frustration of that purpose. 
Id. (citation omitted). Likewise, the careful and hotly debated balance that is the Leon exception 
should not be left in the hands of lower court judges; when at all possible, they too should "Just 
do it." 
181. See generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 201 (G. An-
scombe trans. 2d ed. 1958) ("no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every 
course of action can be made out to accord with the rule"); S. KRIPKE, WITIGENSTEIN ON 
RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIP. 
L. REv. 1151 (1985); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 822 (1983). 
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tainty about when a lower court was supposed to suppress evidence. 
That uncertainty arose from debate over what amounted to a fourth 
amendment violation in the gathering of the evidence in question; it 
remains even under the reasonable reliance exception, because the ex-
ception assumes the evidence was obtained in violation of the fourth 
amendment. The Leon revision creates a new, added layer of impreci-
sion. Because the rule's scope depends on an analysis of its own pur-
pose, the strict and rigid nature of the rule - its ruleness -
disappears to a large degree. 
The deficiency this Note finds present in the Leon rule was ex-
pressed in another way by Justice Scalia in a recent speech. Justice 
Scalia's topic, in his speech The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 182 was 
"the dichotomy between general rules and personal discretion within 
the narrow context of law that is made by the courts. " 183 His main 
purpose was to distinguish the application of general rules to facts 
from the application of a reasonableness or "totality of the circum-
stances" test to a set of facts. In the former case, Scalia asserted that 
"when, in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a general rule, 
... I not only constrain lower courts, I constrain myself as well."184 
In the situation where the Court announces a totality of the circum-
stances test, Scalia acknowledged that it would not be the Supreme 
Court's judgment and application of the new test that defined its con-
tours, but rather that of the lower federal and state courts. He as-
serted that in these situations, courts are really acting as factfinders 
and not as law appliers; they have great discretion and therefore re-
duced legitimacy. Scalia's conclusion was to urge that 
the Rule of Law, the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the 
question allows; and that, to foster a correct attitude toward the matter, 
we appellate judges bear in mind that when we have finally reached the 
point where we can do no more than consult the totality of the circum-
stances, we are acting more as factfinders than as expositors of the 
Iaw.185 
While recognizing the usefulness of totality of the circumstances 
tests in some contexts, this Note argues that where, as here, rules exist 
to constrain lower court decisions, the rules adopted ought to be equal 
to the task. The Leon revision of the exclusionary rule effected a 
change in the nature of that rule as it applies at trial; it is now flexible 
in a fundamental and disabling way, and is therefore inappropriate for 
a rule meant effectively to constrain the actions of lower court 
judges.186 Assuming the Supreme Court is serious in its desire to deter 
182. Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989). 
183. Id. at 1176 (emphasis in original). 
184. Id. at 1179. 
185. Id. at 1187 (emphasis in original). 
186. This is not to say that any rule structured so as to foster discretion in the rule-applier is 
therefore flawed. Rather, in this context, translating carefully balanced considerations of consti-
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police misconduct by means of the exclusionary rule, and assuming 
also that the rule as formulated by the Supreme Court is meant to 
control and constrain the lower courts in their actions on this subject, 
the revised exclusionary rule is an ineffective and flawed mechanism. 
Despite widespread pessimism at the time Leon was decided that 
the majority Justices were not truly committed to the exclusionary 
rule as an element of the criminal justice process, Justice White's opin-
ion does speak of the deterrent effect of the rule. The opinion gives no 
indication that he intended to lessen the seriousness with which the 
Court's order, "suppress evidence in certain circumstances," be 
obeyed. It now seems that his commitment to deterrence was genuine, 
for just last Term he joined Justice Brennan's majority opinion in 
James v. Illinois. 187 In reversing the Illinois Supreme Court's exten-
sion of the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule, Justice 
Brennan stated that the Illinois court's approach would "significantly 
weaken the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on police misconduct" 
because the occasions for introducing illegally obtained evidence at 
trial would "vastly increase."188 "So long as we are committed to pro-
tecting the people from the disregard of their constitutional rights dur-
ing the course of criminal investigations, inadmissibility of illegally 
obtained evidence must remain the rule, not the exception."189 The 
fact that Justice White joined this opinion supports the assumption 
that the Leon decision was not meant as merely a stepping-stone to 
entire elimination of the exclusionary rule. His position in James con-
firms that the seriousness with which Leon did take the exclusionary 
rule, when it applied, should not be underestimated. Therefore the 
inefficacy of the Leon exception as a rule that will constrain lower 
court judges is a problem in need of correction. 
CONCLUSION 
Not all of the errors in application of Leon stem from the causes 
identified here. But this Note argues that the incidence of error is 
higher than it would be had the three factors discussed above been 
avoided. The problems caused by these factors could be rectified by 
several, progressively ambitious, remedies. One is simple advocacy. 
tutional policy by the Supreme Court into guidelines for lower court applications, rules that are 
designed to constrain are proper. Rules that, by looking back at their own purpose, lose their 
"ruleness," are nearly useless for this constraining task. 
187. 110 s. Ct. 648 (1990). 
188. James, 110 S. Ct. at 654, 655. The impeachment exception allows introduction of ille-
gally obtained evidence at trial to impeach the testimony of a defendant. It predates Leon, but is 
qualitatively different from that exception's introduction of illegally obtained evidence at trial. 
At least as confined by James v. Illinois, the exception allows impeachment use of tainted evi-
dence only when the defendant himself chooses to take the stand; the good faith exception has no 
such defense-controlled characteristic. 
189. James, 110 S. Ct. at 655. 
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Lawyers making suppression motions must carefully articulate the 
steps in the analysis that the court must follow properly to apply the 
reasonable reliance exception to the exclusionary rule. Lawyers 
should condemn as misguided any precedents cited against them that 
reveal the types of application errors demonstrated above. Another 
step would be for the Supreme Court to take a reasonable reliance 
exception case and address the legal community on the label point. It 
could repudiate all use of the "good faith" label, as a way to drive 
home to the lower courts the crucial limitations on the exception es-
tablished in Leon. And most radically, but also most effectively, the 
Court could repeal the exception entirely. Justice Blackmun, in his 
Leon concurrence, emphasized that his vote for the exception was a 
provisional one, subject to change if the existence of the new rule led 
to "a material change in police compliance with the Fourth Amend-
ment." 190 This Note has not presented Justice Blackmun with evi-
dence of such lessened police compliance with the Constitution's 
commands. But it has, based on an observed prevalence of what it 
argues is systematically induced error, presented any Justices whose 
votes, like Justice Blackmun's, were at all provisional with a reason for 
concluding that the experiment has failed. The nature of the change 
made in Leon, even if properly understood as a reasonable reliance 
exception, is one that seriously dilutes the ability of the exclusionary 
rule to achieve the purpose that Leon posits for it. 
Many voices have, in recent years, complained that criminal proce-
dure doctrine has become too complex for courts and police officers to 
administer.191 That may well be true. But the simplification should 
not be, as is sometimes suggested, an elimination of the exclusionary 
rule, 192 or its further erosion by more and more complicated excep-
tions.193 Rather, the exclusionary rule should be kept intact for its 
deterrent and educational effects. 194 In pursuit of these goals, the ex-
clusionary rule should be returned to its pre-Leon state. Leon reaf-
firmed that the goal of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of police 
190. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Blackrnun, J., concurring). 
191. See, e.g., Als~huler, supra note 176, at 287; OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. JUSTICE 
DEPT., REPORT TO THE ATIORNEY GENERAL ON THE SEARCH & SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE (1986), reprinted in 22 u. MICH. J.L. REF. 573 (1989). 
192. Oaks, supra note 33; Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 
JUDICATURE 214 (1978). 
193. The "reasonable" good faith test used in Leon has now been extended to third-party 
consent searches where the police reasonably believed the consenting party had authority to 
allow the search but are later found to have been mistaken. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 
(1990). The difficulties in divining objectively reasonable reliance discussed in this Note will 
likely appear in cases applying this extension of the rule. 
194. See Comment, supra note 33. 
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misconduct, but the Leon exception's existence seriously undermines 
that very aim. 
- David Clark Esseks 
